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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M;CHAEL PATRICK PAYNE, 
J\' and through his 
•ouardian ad Litem, 
JOHN MICHAEL PAYNE, 
iOHN MICHAEL PAYNE and 
orEPHANIE PAYNE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
'IS, 
GARTH G. MYERS, M.D.; 
JOSEPH P. KESLER, M.D.; 
THE STATE OF UTAH AND 
!IANDICAPPED CHI LOREN'S 
SERVICE; and THE DIVIS ION 
)f HEALTH OF THE STATE OF 
t'TAH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 19218 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs against defendants 
~yers. Kesler, the State of Utah Handicapped Children's Service 
•nd the Division of Health of the State of Utah, wherein 
~l31ntiffs claim that defendants Myers and Kesler, who are both 
~hvs1~1ans, provided negligent advice to plaintiffs John Michael 
'·v~e 3nd Stephanie Payne, husband and wife, regarding their pro-
~" 1 1siry lo have a child suffering from a severe genetic disease. 
\s ~ result of the negligent advice, plaintiffs John Michael 
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Payne and Stephanie Payne allege that they became the parents 01 
a second child suffering from a severe genetic disease, the sa~ 
genetic disease from which their first child also suffered. 
Plaintiffs John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne seek damages 
for wrongful birth and plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne seeks 
damages for wrongful life. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment by all defendants were con-
sidered by the district court, and summary judgments were entered 
in favor of the State of Utah and Handicapped Children's Service 
and the Division of Health of the State of Utah against plain-
tiffs John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne on the grounds that 
they did not timely serve a notice of claim against the State of 
Utah defendants pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-12, and 
the motions for summary judgment by defendants Myers and Kesler 
were granted as to all claims by all plaintiffs. The motion for 
summary judgment by the State of Utah defendants as to the claims 
on behalf of Michael Patrick Payne was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's decision 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Myers and Kesler 
as to all claims of all named plaintiffs. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 2, 1975, plaintiffs John Michael Payne and 
-1~phanie Payne gave birth to their first child, Matthew Payne. 
;hortly after the child's birth, he showed signs of a serious 
1eurological impairment and suffered numerous other physical 
Jroblems. He was subsequently treated by defendants Kesler and 
1.1yers, both of whom failed to diagnose Matthew Payne's neurologi-
cal and other physical problems as being related to genetic 
disease. 
In 1977, Matthew was seen and treated by defendants 
Kesler and Myers at the Handicapped Children's Service of the 
State of Utah. In that period of time, plaintiffs John Payne and 
Stephanie Payne requested genetic counseling on several occasions 
:rom Kesler and/or Myers as well as counseling and advice 
regarding the possibility that Matthew's illnesses were related 
ro a genetic disease. Both parents were anxious to have another 
child, but they did not want to run the risk of having a second 
child suffer in the same way as their first. The parents speci-
:1cally requested that they be given genetic counseling by one 
"'Jalified to perform the same, so as to minimize the risk. The 
-;ar·ents specifically informed the defendants that they were 
3nx1ous to have other children when they requested the genetic 
_lJunsel ing. 
An appointment to meet with a doctor trained in genetic 
•Junse ling, Dr. Robert Fineman, was set up for plaintiffs by 
Jefendants for some time in the fall of 1977, but Dr. Fineman was 
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unable to keep the appointment, and plaintiffs were notified bv 
telephone that the appointment was canceled. Subsequently, 
plaintiffs met with defendants Kesler and Myers, and John Payne 
and Stephanie Payne advised Kesler and Myers that the appointmenc 
for genetic counseling had been canceled. Mr. and Mrs. Payne 
again reiterated their concerns at this time regarding the need 
for genetic counseling, so that they would feel assured that it 
was safe to have another child. This last appointment with 
Kesler and Myers was probably held some time in the fall of 1977, 
or at least before March of 1978. During that visit, both Kesler 
and Myers advised Mr. and Mrs. Payne that, although another gene-
tic counseling appointment could be set up, neither Dr. Kesler 
nor Dr. Myers felt that such counseling was necessary. 
Furthermore, the doctors advised Mr. and Mrs. Payne that it was 
safe to have another child, and that Mrs. Payne need not be con-
cerned about any genetic problems related to having another 
child. 
In reliance on the assurances given by Drs. Kesler and 
Myers, Mr. and Mrs. Payne began a course of conduct which would 
ultimately result in the birth of their second child, plaintiff 
Michael Patrick Payne, on January 27, 1979. The course of con-
duct taken by the Paynes in reliance on Ors. Myers' and Kesler's 
advice included a visit by Mrs. Payne on February 14, 1978, to 
her obstetrician/gynecologist, Dr. R. Kent Gibbs. At that oft. 
visit, Dr. Gibbs removed the intrauterine birth control devise 
(IUD) from Mrs. Payne. [Gibbs Depo. p. 20] Mrs. Payne con-
-4-
t,;cred Dr. Gibbs again on March 13, 1978. [Gibbs Depo., p. 21) 
"e IUD was removed so that the Paynes could conceive another 
~niJd. As indicated above, the second child, plaintiff Michael 
p~t rick Payne, was born on January 27, 1979. The Paynes were 
.hdrged for the services provided by Dr. Gibbs as part of their 
2 verall bill for services relating to obstetrical care and deli-
very of the baby in the amount of $345. [Gibbs Depo. Exhibit A) 
shortly after his birth, Michael developed the same neurological 
impairments and defects from which his brother suffers. 
A few months after Michael's birth, both children were 
seen by a geneticist who upon examining them almost immediately 
diagnosed Pelizaeus-Merzbacher disease as the probable genetic 
impairment from which the boys suffer. 
Pelizaeus-Merzbacher in its classical form is an heredi-
Lary genetic, slowly progressive brain disorder with no known 
Lreatment or cure. Early symptoms include rotating eye movements 
and jerking and rolling head movements or tremor. In the first 
~ew years of life, there is a slow progression of the neurologi-
:al signs and a decline of the intellectual or mental level. 
Ultimately, the symptoms of the disease include severe spasti-
c1ty, loss of sight, severe involvement of speech and finally 
vegetation and death in the second or third decade. Renier, et 
~!:.• "Connatal Pelizaeus-Merzbacher Disease with Congenital 
''r1·Jor in Two Maternal Cousins", Acta Neuropathologica ( 1982); 
'•a1man & Wright, The Practice of Pediatric Neurology, p. 729 
g7 s) • 
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As part of their complaint in this action, plaintiffs 
John Michael Payne and Stephanie Payne seek as damages, among 
other things, the "[c]osts incident to the pregnancy and delivet 
of plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne in excess of $1,000:" [Tr. i 
The lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in 
favor of defendants Myers and Kesler was based on its interpreta 0 
tion of Utah Code Annotated S63-30-4, as amended in 1978, to 
absolutely preclude personal liability of a governmental employee 
for said employee's negligent conduct. As set forth more fully 
below, plaintiffs take the position that said statute is inappli-
cable to this case because plaintiffs' cause of action arose 
prior to the effective date of the statute, and/or because the 
lower court's interpretation of the statute as applied to the 
facts of this case was wrong and violates sound public policy, 
and/or the statute is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4, AS AMENDED, 
CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO BAR 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MYERS 
AND KESLER BECAUSE SAID DEFENDANTS' 
NEGLIGENCE OCCURRED AND PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS 
AROSE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 
STATUTE. 
A. U.C.A. §63-30-4 As Amended, Is To Be Given 
Prospective Effect Only. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4 was amended in 1978. The 
legislature expressed its intent when it amended said statute ~ 
stating that it was applicable only after the effective date of 
-6-
ne amendment. Said section states, in part: 
The remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for an injury caused by an act 
or omission which occurs during the perfor-
mance of such employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is, after the effective date of 
this Act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through 
gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
[emphasis added) 
Section 63-30-4, as amended, became effective on March 
JQ, 1978. Laws of Utah 1978 at 91. It cannot be applied 
retroactively to events, occurrences or transactions occurring 
before March 30, 1978. 
In addition to the specific language in §63-30-4 
~recluding its retroactive application, the general rule of 
;tatutory construction is that statutes are to be applied 
prospectively only unless the statute specifically states that it 
is to have retroactive application. Utah has codified this 
1eneral rule in U.C.A. §68-3-3 which states: "No part of these 
cevised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
§63-30-4 cannot be applied retroactively because it does not 
expressly declare itself to be retroactive. 
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B. A Statute Cannot Be Ap~lied Retroactively If 
Existing Substantive Rights Are Terminated 
By the Statute. 
Courts have applied an exception to the rule that 
statutes are to be applied prospectively only, in cases where t:,_ 
statute involved procedural rights only, or where the statute 
dealt only with a clarification or the interpretation of a prior 
statute. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes §416. In a case involving a 
constitutional challenge of certain "children's rights" statutes, 
but which did not turn on the issue of retroactivity, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in the case of In Re J. P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 
1982), explained the general rule and the exception as noted 
above regarding retroactivity in Footnote 4 to the main opinion 
as follows: 
The well-established general rule is that 
statutes not expressly retroactive should 
only be applied prospectively •••• 
Exceptions to this general rule have been 
found where an amendment's effect was 
'procedural' or 'remedial.' Foil v. 
Ballinger, Utah, 601 P.2d 144 (1979) 
(clarified statutory notice provision and 
changed 'commenced' to 'initiated'); Petty 
v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948) 
(added new categories of suits where jury 
is advisory); Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 
Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) (empowered 
courts to make additional findings after 
entry of judgment). In Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P.2d at 151 we quoted with approval a 
passage from Okland Constr. Co. v. 
Industial Comm., •.. which stated that a 
statute or amendment may be retroactively 
applied where it 'deals only with clarifi-
cation or amplification as to how the law 
should have been understood prior to its 
enactment. ' 
The 1981 Amendment to §78-3(a)-48(l)(a) 
did not make a merely procedural change 
or clarify how the 1980 statute should 
have been understood originally. 
Although the amendment does not alter the 
subsection's controlling principle ••• 
it deletes one of the two criteria for 
determining the child's best interests, 
clarifies the other, and adds seven new 
criteria. The additions are extensive, 
more than doubling the subsection's 
length. Changes of this magnitude do 
not fit within the relative! narrow 
exception illustrated above. emphasis 
added] (648 P.2d at 1369-1370] 
In the instant case, the 1978 change to §63-30-4 was 
extensive and did not affect only procedural rights. Nor did the 
amendment clarify or interpret prior law. The amendment to 
563-30-4, effectively destroys plaintiffs' common law right to 
file suit and pursue an action against Ors. Kesler and Myers for 
simple negligence, which is clearly a substantive right not 
•ithin the exceptions set forth in In Re J. P., supra. The 
amendment not only affects substantive rights, it purports to 
t0tally extinguish basic, substantive, common law rights to hold 
'reating physicians personally liable for their medical malprac-
t1ce. 
The case of Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314 
1977), helps define the distinction between substantive and pro-
:edural rights. The court stated: 
While there is no precise definition of 
either term, it is generally agreed that a 
substantive law creates, defines and regu-
lates rights while a procedural one 
prescribes the method of enforcing such 
rights or obtaining redress. (574 P.2d at 
1315] 
The case of Kolodejchuk v. Lucier, 52 Or.App. 81, 630 
-9-
P.2d 889 (1981), provides an insightful explanation of the 
retroactivity question, distinguishing between procedural and 
substantive rights: 
The general rule in this state is that, 
unless the legislature indicates otherwise, 
'procedural' or 'remedial' statutes are 
applied retroactively and 'substantive' 
statutes are not •.•• These labels are 
commonly applied, however, only after a 
determination as to which effect should be 
given •••• The focal question is whether 
the new statute affects legal rights and 
obligations arising out of past transac-
tions. If it does, then the statute is 
substantive and normally will not be 
applied retroactively. [emphasis added] 
(630 P.2d at 891] 
In the case of Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954), the Utah 
Supreme Court made a similar statement: 
A statute is not made retroactive merely 
because it draws on antecedent facts for 
its operation •••• A law is retrospective, 
in its legal sense, which takes away or 
impairs vested rights acquired under 
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disa-
bility in respect to transactions or con-
siderations already passed. [emphasis 
added] (268 P. 2d at 692] 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
cause of action is a property right which the legislature canno 
take away retroactively. In Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation 
Co. v. Dist. Court of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d l 
(1940), the court stated: 
With reference to a right of action it is 
stated in 6 RCL under Title, 
'Constitutional Law', ... as follows: 'A 
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vested right of action is property in the 
same sense in which tangible things are 
property, and is equally protected against 
arbitrary interference, and whether it 
springs from contract or the principles of 
the common law, it is not competent for the 
legislature to take it away.' 
And this Court has approved and affirmed 
this doctrine in the case Halling v. 
Industrial Comm. of Utah, et al., 71 Utah 
112, 263 P. 78, citing 2d Cooley's Const. 
Law 8th Ed., • [104 P. 2d at 360) 
The recent case of State of Utah v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 
iJtah 1982), contains language indicating that the statute in 
effect at the time the complaint is filed controls the litiga-
t1on. However, the issue in~ was concerned entirely with 
the question of which statute applied for purposes of determining 
the procedural rights of the parties for employee grievances. No 
substantive rights were involved, and even though the court 
referred, in dicta, to a gene.ral rule that the statute in effect 
at the time the complaint is filed applies to both procedural and 
substantive rights, it is clear that the court was applying a 
procedural statute retroactively, and did not intend to expand 
:he general rule of law that a statute cannot be applied retroac-
tively to cut off substantive rights. This is evidenced by the 
c0urt's statement in the second to the last paragraph of the 
'Jptnion: 
On remand of this case, the Personnel 
Management Act will control the administra-
tive proceeding since it does not affect 
any common law or vested rights, and since 
jurisdiction of the district court had not 
yet attached at the time the Employees' 
Grievance Procedure Act was repealed. 
[emphasis added) [656 P.2d at 1002) 
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P·.Jrt~er:nort!, •'a sta~ ~r_>-:' ~ •• -u:; t' j ;,. ·.:t_• rl •. ~l t. 
ret r0d.ct l 'Je et t ec':. t-_;1dt l ':.s l.1n(;u3,;e c1•._jS,'Jn,1~ l ·/ ;_Jer'Tl ~ r 
Aircraft Co. ·; . Crans t c n , 2 -l c_· .1 1 . R <' • r. ~ S l , 3 ~ -l P. :: •1 n . 
And, •Ii] n the C.lSe ')f iouDt, ~he ioubt 01ust De res.i 1 ·:~ '. l j l. 
retrospective effect.• Wilsnn v. St.lte Ex Rel. Okla. rn 
594 P.2d 1210 !Okla. 19"9). lt is t'.Jrther a 1Well-sL1t••J ~,r, -
ciple that the substantive law to he .lpplied in a .:ase l' ".t> ,,. 
that "'as in effect as of the date of the crLtical event, 
occurrence or transaction. 
Supreme Court in Ok land Constr. Co. ·;. rn,1ustrial Comm., '>~- '·· 
208 (Utah 1974), . ,herein the court stated: 
lt is true as the employee Okland 
contends: That it is entitled ti) have it o; 
rights determined on the basis of the law 
as it existed at the time of the 
occurrence; and that a later statute or 
amendment should not be applied in a 
retroactive manner to deprive a party of 
his rights 1r impose greater liability upnn 
him. [520 P.2d at 2101 
This <;ame principle -.,as cited appr'Jvingly in Foil v. ballL1;e: 
':l01 P.2c1 144 tlJt.lh l'l"91. 
Thus, it is clear •_hat .l st.H.c1t>" '"'hi ch terminates .lr. 
:'here -;hc"'u: ~ ~e :<- 1uest:. 1n t~1at -' l ':'.""l ~.'le ~ass,J. JP 
• rn . " " '. ; . : ; , 
,, n ------
.__,, ·, 1 i l r. l , l. n .-\ r : .~ ... ·--: ,1 ~ .1 s t'> _ :1 ·: .. ; "·' '. l ,, 1 r : 
"."''~,, · "',~r-- ... ·.is .~,l '.'"""·~·~ '. •' . !"-'71 : " ,.; r, ·:,_• :- l 1:-'1• : -" 
1 • t•ln. The court neecled t" deci 1e •hether the amend-
· " • .'» r i Jht s. Part of the amended statute aDolished the 
1• "' 1 '. s.,ur~e rule and allowed the defendant '.Tledical care 
'"r 'put into evidence any benefits the plaintiff was 
'"~ f 1r his inJuries from collateral sources. The court 
·•at this part of the medical malpractice statute changed 
- ~easure of damages available to a plaintiff in a malpractice 
. " and that such a change was a substantive one and as a 
•he amended statute could not be applied retroactively. 
urt. stated: 
A rule affecting the measure of damages 
is a substantive right, Prank Bricoe Co., 
Inc. v. Rutgers State Univ. & College of 
Med1c1ne and Denistry of N.J .. et al., 130 
:-<.J. Super. 493, 327 A.2d 687 (19"4\. and a 
change in the law affecting the measure of 
an lnJured person's right of recovery can-
not be applied retroactively. [574 P.2d at 
1316] 
Just as in Allen, so in the instant case, the amendment 
11-~ •!ttect1vely changes the measure of :iamages available 
1overnment employee for his 
··~~~4ence. If the plaint1~ts' r1~ht to sue and recover 
·~: .. -1·~'1_.:i.t_• 1:1 his ;Jers(Jnal :-apaclt'f ts aool1~hed, ':.hen the 
'3S•-". :.;. 'i63-J0-29. 
This is another basis for holding that the amendment to the 
statute affects a substantive right and cannot be applied 
retroactively. 
The only question then is what are the critical 
occurrences in the instant case which determine whether plain-
tiffs held a substantive right before the amendment took effect. 
This issue will be discussed under the next subheading. 
C. Plaintiffs Acquired Substantive Rights Prior To The 
Effective Date of §63-30-4, As Amended, Because The 
Physicians' Negligent Advice Was Given, And 
Plaintiffs Relied Thereon And Incurred Medical 
Expense Obligations As A Result Of Said Negligent 
Advice, Prior To The Effective Date of §63-30-4, As 
Amended. 
It is clear from the facts of this case that the amended 
statute did not become effective until after the date of the 
alleged negligent acts committed by defendants Myers and Kesler. 
Although neither John Payne nor Stephanie Payne could place a 
specific date on the visit when Dr. Kesler and Dr. Myers advised 
them that Matthew Payne's disease was not genetically related a~ 
that the Paynes could have another child without concern for 
genetic problems, both Mr. and Mrs. Payne stated that it was in 
the fall of 1977 that the visit occurred. Furthermore, the last 
entry or medical visit found in the Handicapped Children's 
Service Record before the birth of the second child is October I, 
1977. Consequently, the alleged negligence of the doctors 
occurred prior to March 30, 1978, the effective date of §63-3iJ-" 
as amended. 
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Furthermore, services provided by Mrs. Payne's obstetri-
_ 1an. Dr. R. Kent Gibbs, in removing the IUD from Mrs. Payne 
0 1Jo~ing her to become pregnant, were provided on February 14, 
•q7R, approximately one and a half months before the effective 
·Jate of the amended statute. At such time as those services were 
cendered, the Paynes incurred an obligation to pay for the ser-
vices of Dr. Gibbs, which services would never have been provided 
nor the obligation incurred, had defendants Myers and Kesler not 
negligently advised Paynes that it was safe to have another child 
without concern for genetic ramifications. 
Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that since the negligence 
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment to 
§63-30-4, and since the Paynes incurred obligations for medical 
services as a result of said negligence, also prior to the effec-
live date of S63-30-4, that their substantive rights arose prior 
to the effective date of the statute. The amendment is therefore 
not applicable because applying it to this case would constitute 
a retroactive application of the statute which is expressly pro-
hibited as discussed above. 
The critical occurrences in the instant case, which give 
rise to plaintiffs' substantive rights prior to the effective 
Jote of §63-30-4, are the negligent advice of defendants Myers 
•nd Kesler and the subsequent reliance by plaintiffs John Michael 
"1vr1e and Stephanie Payne on said negligent advice in obligating 
~emselves for medical services provided in removing the IUD so 
Js "o allow Mrs. Payne to become pregnant. Both of these criti-
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cal occurrences took place prior to the effective date of the 
amendment to S63-30-4. The substantive law in effect as of the 
date of those critical occurrences is the law that must be 
applied to this case because those occurrences created a substan" 
tive right in favor of Paynes which cannot be retroactively taken 
away from them by an amendment to S63-30-4. 
Defendants will undoubtedly argue that plaintiffs' right; 
or cause of action did not accrue until either the date the ba~ 
was conceived or the date the baby was born. This court should 
reject that argument for the following two reasons, which will~ 
enumerated in more detail below. First, it is clear that the law 
applicable to a cause of action is that law in effect at the time 
of the occurrence or transaction that gives rise to the rights anc 
liabilities of the parties. The "occurrence" giving rise to the 
liability of the defendant doctors was the negligent advice whi~ 
was given prior to the effective date of the amendment to 
§63-30-4. Second, once the plaintiffs incurred any detriment or 
obligation, regardless of how small it may have been, which obli-
gation was a direct result of the defendants' negligence, 
plaintiffs' cause of action arose and any consequences subsequer' 
to the date that cause of action arose are a part of the origina 1 
cause of action and relate back to that same cause of action. 
The general rule has previously been stated that a 
statute will not be applied retroactively if it affects the 
substantive rights of the parties. In most cases, it will 
generally be the case that the substantive rights are determined 
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,,1p 1, the cause of action accrues. It has further generally been 
,;_ 3 ted that a cause of action accrues when a party could first 
,.~inta1n a successful suit. 
Medical malpractice actions, however, are somewhat dif-
rerent than the average negligence case. In most negligence 
0ctions, the injury occurs at the same time, or very closely in 
;_ime, to the act of negligence. This is not necessarily the case 
1n a medical malpractice action, especially one involving negli-
qent medical advice. As in the instant case, the negligent 
idvice may be given before any concrete actions are taken in 
reliance upon that advice. But the negligent advice is the con-
Juct that gives rise to liability on the part of the doctor. The 
:ights and liabilities of the parties, therefore, must be 
~•sured by the law in effect at the time of the actions of the 
.Joctors which give rise to later liability. 
Even the Utah Medical Malpractice Act recognizes that 
the treatment by the physician should be given some operative 
effect. Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, states, in per-
'inent part: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged act, 
omission, neglect or occurrence •••• 
[emphasis added] 
This section recognizes that medical malpractice cases 
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are often different than the average tort case. It can be so~ 
time between the time of the negligence and the time of 
discovery, and the Medical Malpractice Act therefore provides 
codification of the •discovery rule". But even though the 
discovery rule is applied, allowing two years from the time that 
the patient discovers or should have discovered an injury within 
which to bring suit, the legislature also recognized the opera-
tive effect of the doctors' negligence and provides for an out-
side limit on the time for bringing a cause of action, that bei~ 
four years after the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence. 
In the instant case, the negligence occurred some time 
in the fall of 1977, clearly prior to the date of the amendment 
to S63-30-4. Thus, the substantive rights of the parties arose 
prior to the effective date of the amendment, which right cannot 
be extinguished at a later date by an amendment to §63-30-4. 
It is further interesting to note that the Utah 
Legislature in 1983 amended the notice provision of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-11(1) in 1983 to read: "A 
claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person commences 
to run." Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(1) (Inter. Supp. 19831. 
Since the four-year medical malpractice statute of limitations 
begins to run as of the date of negligence, the Legislature has 
here recognized the potential for a right of some type (cla1ml ,_-
arise as of the date of the negligence. 
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Furthermore, as indicated above, plaintiffs incurred an 
11gation for medical services to Dr. Gibbs for removal of the 
1ilD and for other services provided prior to the effective date 
·f tJ1e amendment to §63-30-4. These services were clearly 
eldted to the Paynes' desire to have another child, and would 
not have been incurred if defendants Kesler and Myers had not 
assuced plaintiffs that they could conceive and have another 
child without fear of any genetic problems. Although the actual 
Dill for services rendered may not have been received by Mr. and 
Mrs. Payne until after their second child was delivered, that 
bill includes the costs of all obstetrical care provided by Dr. 
Gibbs dating back to the time the IUD was removed. The obliga-
tion to pay for the services rendered in removing the IUD was 
incurred at the time those services were rendered. If the Paynes 
had learned prior to the date of conception of the genetic 
disease, and had terminated any attempts at having another child, 
they clearly would have been responsible for the services pro-
1ided by Dr. Gibbs up to that point in time. Their obligation 
to pay for those services would have given them a right of action 
Dack against Drs. Myers and Kesler because the obligation was 
incurred as a direct result of the negligent advice provided by 
~ ~s ler and Myers. 
That a patient becomes obligated to pay for services 
~.1dered by a physician as the services are rendered is clearly 
"' forth in the case of In Re Shoptaw's Estate, 343 P.2d 740 
iWash. 1959). This case involved the issue of whether a 
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doctor's bill for services rendered during the last 11 months~: 
a person's life took priority over a claim of the United States 
for back taxes where both were made claims against the deceasec 
person's estate. The Washington Supreme Court discussed the 
issue of whether the doctor's bills were in fact debts due from 
the deceased and stated: 
The test is whether, if the decedent had 
recovered from her illness, she would have 
been personally liable for the payment of 
those obligations. The general rule is 
that the patient is liable, either under 
express or implied contract, for the medi-
cal services rendered to him. The 
patient's liability arises as t~physi­
cian's services are rendered on his behalf 
during his 11fet1me. After the patient's 
death, his physician's claim for such ser-
vices relates to a debt due from the dece-
dent • [emphasis added] [343 P. 2d at 
742] 
This same general rule was referred to in Fugitt v. Myers, 9 
Wash.App. 523, 513 P.2d 297 (1973), wherein the court stated: 
[T]he general rule is that a patient is 
liable, under either an express or implied 
contract, for the medical services rendered 
to him, and after the patient's death the 
attending physician's claim for such ser-
vices is a debt due from the decedent's 
estate. [513 P.2d at 299] 
Cleveland Anesthesia Group v. Krulak, 135 N.E. 685 !Oh1', 
1956), was a case where the Anesthesia Group brought suit to 
recover the cost of providing anesthetic services to the 
defendant's wife while she was in the hospital. The trial co 1" 
entered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. 
The appellate court affirmed. Regarding the obligation for the 
anesthetic services provided, the court stated: 
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It is well established in this state that 
a husband is bound to pay for medical ser-
vices rendered to his wife as necessities, 
and that the services of a surgeon, in con-
junction with the services of one spe-
cializing in anesthesiology in the 
performance of an operation, are indeed 
necessities. 
Under the facts shown here to exist, the 
husband may be held liable. At common law, 
when one secures services to be rendered, 
whether to himself or to another, there 
arises an implied contract to pay for such 
services. [135 N.E.2d at 687] 
The above-referenced cases clearly establish that once 
the Paynes received the services from Dr. Gibbs in February of 
1378, which services were only obtained by Paynes because of the 
advice given them by defendants Myers and Kesler, the Paynes 
immediately incurred an obligation to pay Dr. Gibbs for those 
services. As was subsequently shown, the advice given by Drs. 
~yers and Kesler was negligent because it was not genetically 
;afe for Mrs. Payne to become pregnant again, and the obligation 
incurred by Paynes to Dr. Gibbs constituted a cause of action as 
1f the date that obligation was incurred {February 14, 1978). 
r1>1s 0bligation is a damage incurred by Mr. and Mrs. Payne caused 
"Y the negligent advice of Drs. Myers and Kesler. This cause of 
t1an for damages arose prior to the effective date of the 
1e11dment to §63-30-4. Therefore, the plaintiffs had a cause of 
1:t1on prior to the amendment to §63-30-4. 
Once the cause of action arose when Paynes incurred the 
1nligation to or. Gibbs, then any additional damages incurred by 
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Paynes, which are foreseeable and which are the natural result 
defendants' negligent advice, are recoverable by Paynes as part 
of the basic cause of action. It is a well-settled principle or 
law that a cause of action cannot be split and that all damages 
relating to a cause of action, whether present or future, must ~ 
joined in the same lawsuit. 22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, 526 states' 
The law does not permit the owner of a 
single or entire cause of action or an 
entire or indivisible demand, without the 
consent of the person against whom the 
cause or demand exists, to divide or split 
that cause or demand so as to make it the 
subject of several actions. The entire 
cause must be determined in one action, and 
if suit is brought for a part of the claim, 
the judgment obtained precludes a second 
action for any remaining portion of the 
claim, even though the form of the second 
action is not identical with the first or 
different grounds of relief are set forth 
in the second suit. Hence, in estimating 
the pecuniary loss which a plaintiff has 
sustained as a result of the defendant's 
tort or breach of contract, all the con-
sequences of the injury, future as well as 
past, are to be taken into consideration: 
the recovery, if any, must be for all the 
injuries and all damages resulting 
therefrom, whether past, present, or 
prospective, once and for all. In cases 
coming within this rule, a recovery may be 
had for prospective damages which are 
reasonably certain to accrue. [22 Am.Jur. 2d 
at 46-47] 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court quoted approvingly fr~ 
a Minnesota case in Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & 
Mining Co., 13 Utah 108, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), and stated: 
A personal injury received at the hands of 
a wrongdoer constitutes but one right of 
action. It cannot be divided into several 
parts to accord with the elements of dama-
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ges recoverable therefor. It presents a 
single controversy to be settled in a 
single action. [191 P.2d at 619] 
The Masich case also made a statement relevant to the 
It stated: 
Obviously when an act excludes causes of 
action arising before the act is passed, no 
valid reason exists for denying the 
employee his right of action for the 
injuries sustained before passage of the 
act. [Id. at 623] 
~involved the interpretation of Utah's Occupational Disease 
Disability Law and whether that Act was the exclusive remedy for 
an employee partially disabled by silicosis where the Act only 
provided compensation for employees totally disabled by the 
In light of the court's statement, quoted above, that a 
personal injury is one right of action and cannot be divided, the 
court's statement regarding causes of action arising before 
passage of the Act is directly applicable to the instant case • 
. ~ <.·a use of act ion arose when Paynes' incurred the medical expense 
lbligation. That constituted an injury, and since the cause of 
ection for personal injury cannot be divided up, all subsequent 
1amages flowing naturally from the original cause of action 
celate back to that date prior to passage of the amendment to 
)n l-3lJ-4, 
Clearly, when Ors. Myers and Kesler gave plaintiffs the 
<rl•1,P that they could conceive and have another child without 
ear 0f genetic problems, they could foresee that plaintiffs 
•'ulj take the steps necessary to conceive and have a child. It 
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was also clearly foreseeable that if the advice was not proper, 
that another genetically diseased child could be born and thar 
plaintiffs would incur expenses and damages as a result thereof 
Therefore, any and all damages that occurred following 
the initial date that a cause of action was formed are a part of 
that cause of action and are recoverable by plaintiffs against 
defendants. Since medical expense obligations were incurred 
prior to the effective date of the amendment, all future damages 
to plaintiffs relate back to that date at the very least. 
In addition, the determination of the time when the 
plaintiffs suffered appreciable and measurable damages, which 
would give rise to a cause of action, is a question of fact which 
would preclude summary judgment. Haslund v. City of Seattle, 547 
P.2d 1221 (Wash. 1976). 
In summary, plaintiff~' position is that their substan-
tive rights were in existence prior to the effective date of 
§63-30-4, as amended, because defendants' negligence occurred 
before and plaintiffs incurred obligations before the statute 
became effective. If the court were to apply §63-30-4, as 
amended, to this case and eliminate any potential liability of 
Drs. Kesler and Myers as individuals, then the court would be 
giving §63-30-4 an impermissible retroactive application. 
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D. The Law In Effect As Of The Date Of Negligence 
And/Or Date Paynes First Incurred Medical Expenses 
Applies To This Case. 
It has been shown above, that plaintiffs held substan-
rive rights prior to the date §63-30-4, as amended, became effec-
t, re, Therefore, S63-30-4 as it existed prior to being amended 
1s the statute applicable to the facts of this case. Prior to 
the 1978 amendment, the statute stated: 
Nothing contained in this Act, unless spe-
cifically provided, is to be construed as 
an admission or denial of liability or 
responsibility insofar as governmental 
entities are concerned. Wherein immunity 
from suit is waived by this Act, consent to 
be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. 
Obviously, the statute prior to the 1978 amendment does 
not bar an action against an employee of a governmental entity in 
his personal capacity, and in fact, makes no reference whatsoever 
to the status of governmental employees. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court held in Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), that the Governmental Immunity Act had 
r10 application to individuals, and that a psychologist working 
•ith the University of Utah Medical Center alleged to have been 
negligent in his treatment of a patient was not afforded immunity 
,_111der the discretionary/ministerial analysis applied to agents of 
':1µ government. 
Thus, under the law applicable to the facts of the 
1stant case, Drs. Kesler and Myers can be held personally liable 
[,Jc- their negligent conduct to plaintiffs. This law should be 
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applied and the court should reverse the lower court's summari 
judgment in favor of said defendants. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MYERS 
AND KESLER ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4, 
as amended in 1978, does apply to the facts of the instant case, 
plaintiffs contend that said statute was never intended to bar 
their claims against Drs. Kesler and Myers as individuals. 
A. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) Does ~c 
Apply To The Facts Of This Case. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge this court's recent decision in 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), which case contaiM 
statements to the effect that the Governmental Immunity Act arnenc· 
ments have extinguished any personal liability of employees of 
governmental entities for simple negligence. In spite of these 
statements, plaintiffs suggest that Madsen does not bar their 
claims against Myers and Kesler. Footnote 5 in Madsen, states, 
part: 
[W]e express no opinion on the question of 
whether a claim against an employee of a 
government entity would be barred if the 
notice of claim had not been filed but the 
entity had a statutory duty to indemnify 
the employee. [658 P.2d at 630] 
Prior to a 1983 amendment, the governmental entity's statutory 
duty to indemnify its employees arose pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-48-1, et. ~· and was applicable only in 
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... 
., uations where simple negligence of an employee was involved. 
the employee acted with gross negligence, malice or fraud, the 
J'wµrnmental entity was relieved of the statutory duty to indem-
··y. At all times relevant to the instant case, §63-48-3(4) 
No public entity is obligated to pay any 
judgment based on a claim against an 
officer or employee if it is established 
that the officer or employee acted or 
failed to act due to gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. 
If Madsen stands for the proposition that there can be 
110 cause of action for simple negligence against a government 
employee, there would be no need for the statement made by the 
court in Footnote 5, and there would also be no way to reconcile 
the 1978 amendment to §63-30-4 of the Governmental Immunity Act 
•ith the indemnity statute. This court clearly recognized in 
~adsen the statutory duty to indemnify, and made no statement to 
the effect that the amendment to §63-30-4 of the Governmental 
Immunity Act impliedly repealed the indemnity statute. However, 
i: §63-30-4 abolishes any personal liability for simple negli-
Jenee of a government employee, there could be no situation in 
•n1ch the statutory duty to indemnify would arise. This would 
ialate the general principal of statutory construction that 
•equ1res construing related statutes in such a way as to give 
"d·~,,nable and operable effect to both. Madsen further 
~yn1zed the existence of the duty to indemnify and also the 
''tent1al for a claim against an employee in Footnote 11, which 
.~ates: 
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The intent to adopt a new rule for offi-
cial immunity is further evident in the 
1978 amendment to the notice provision, 
§63-30-11, which added a provision to the 
effect that the service of a notice of 
claim upon an employee of a government 
entity is not a condition precedent to the 
commencement of an action against the 
employee, and a further provision that the 
entity need not receive a notice of claim 
where only the employee was sued, unless 
the entity had a statutory duty to indem-
nify the employee. (658 P.2d at 633] 
Both Footnote 5 and Footnote 11 of Madsen describe a 
situation which is present in the instant case. This case deals 
with claims against employees of the state in their individual 
capacity. The claims are for simple negligence only, which gives 
rise to the statutory duty to indemnify. This court stated in 
Madsen that it was expressing no opinion on the question of 
whether a claim against an employee would be barred if the notice 
of claim had not been filed where the entity had a statutory du·· 
to indemnify. If there is no basis for a claim or for personal 
liability against an employee for simple negligence, there coul~ 
be no situation where the statutory duty to indemnify arises. 
Thus, plaintiffs suggest that the court has not yet decided the 
full extent of the meaning of the amendment to §63-30-4. 
Furthermore, any reference in Madsen to the effect of 
§63-30-4, as amended, on actions against employees, should be 
considered no more than dicta because the defendant in ~ "' 
not simply a government employee, but rather a government off'-
cial, the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions. The defendants in the instant case are medical 
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_tors who happened to be working for the State of Utah while 
, 2 rt1Jrming services for plaintiffs. 
B. U.C.A. S63-30-4, As Amended, Must Be Given A 
Reasonable Interpretation. 
In Nelson v. Stoker, et al., P.2d (Utah 
1 y83), No. 18244, filed August 1, 1983, the Supreme Court stated: 
'This Court has previously stated that we will not interpret a 
statute in such a way that results in an absurdity.• If the 1978 
amendment to S63-30-4 is interpreted to mean that there is no 
~ersonal liability of employees of the State for simple negli-
~ence, then we are left with the absurd result that an employer 
1 the State) can be held liable for the negligent acts of its 
employees while the employees themselves cannot be held liable. 
Tr.e general, common law rule for holding an employer liable for 
·he negligent acts of its employee has been that of agency or 
cespondeat superior. If an employee is not liable, then there is 
10 ~as1s in common law for holding the employer liable. Yet, 
!63-30-4 appears to require that an employer can still be held 
cJable even though the employee cannot. Furthermore, such a 
result is absurd because it cannot be reconciled with the indem-
1it1 statute which provides that a governmental employer can be 
~quired to indemnify its employees for liabilities created by 
empt iyees' simple negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously noted that it 
'"'Jl'l be absurd to grant immunity to an employee physician while 
1 0~l1ng the employer liable for that employee's negligence. In 
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Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517 (Utah 1980), an action was brought 
against the State of Utah claiming negligence of the University 
of Utah Medical Center, a staff psychiatrist and a psychologist 
with the Salt Lake County Mental Health Department who was 
working with the University of Utah Medical Center under a 
contractual arrangement. The trial court granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that all defendants 
were protected by the Governmental Immunity Act. On appeal. the 
Utah Supreme Court held that, although the operation of a health 
care facility is protected under the Governmental Immunity Act, 
such immunity was waived by the government because the injury was 
caused by the negligent act or omission of an employee, and that 
the injury did not arise out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function. 
The Supreme Cou.rt further held that the Governmental 
Irmnunity Act does not apply to individuals but only to governmen-
tal entities. The court stated that physician-employees of 
governmental entities should not be given absolute immunity from 
their medical malpractice. Finally, the court made the follow1~ 
significant statement: 
Other reasons for the above holding are 
manifest. For one, it is contrary to 
reason to deny governmental immunity to a 
public employer and then grant it to. the 
very employee allegedly causing the inJury. 
Moreover, a grant of immunity in the pre 
sent case, would of necessity, shield all 
practitioners employed, even under tem-
porary contract from another source, by a 
governmental health care facility from any 
liability for malpractice. [emphasis added] 
[613 P.2d at 520] 
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Although the amendment to S63-30-4 was not applicable to 
,,e fa, ~s of Frank v. State, because the claim arose prior to the 
"' fe' t 1 ve date of the amended statute, it is nonetheless clear 
1,at the Utah Supreme Court, in 1980, believed it to be unreaso-
.able to grant immunity to a doctor employee of the state whose 
·1egligence caused the injuries complained of. Additionally, the 
_0urt obviously considered it unacceptable to immunize state-
employed physicians from any liability for malpractice. These 
statements were made after the effective date of the amendment to 
~63-30-4. 
Thus, it is clear that the interpretation given by the 
lower court to §63-30-4 is both unreasonable and unfair. This 
:aurt should interpret said statute to preserve the common law 
:lairns of plaintiffs against the doctors in their individual 
:apacities. 
c. The Trial Court's Interpretation of u.c.A. §63-30-4 
Violates Public Policy. 
The ramifications of immunizing state-employed physi-
tans from any personal liability for medical malpractice are 
staggering. If §63-30-4, as amended, is interpreted to mean that 
"~ state employee can be held personally liable for his or her 
Simple negligence, then every employee at a state-operated medi-
•I •3r1 l1ty, such as the University of Utah Medical Center, is 
"h'dutely immune from personal liability for malpractice. The 
101; redress available to an injured person is an action against 
'1e state. In the case of serious injuries, such as in the 
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instant case, a suit against the state for a maximum recovery 01 
$250,000, based on the 1983 amendment to the Governmental 
Immunity Act, is simply not an adequate remedy. In the case of 
plaintiffs' claim, the total possible recovery against the state 
is possibly only $100,000 per person, which is well below the 
costs necessary to provide care and treatment to plaintiff 
Michael Payne. (See u.c.A. S63-30-29) 
The amount of the potential recovery is not the only 
reason why §63-30-4 should not be interpreted to eliminate per-
sonal liability of physician-employees of the state. In addi-
tion, a patient's right to bring a malpractice action against a 
negligent physician has the meritorious effect of promoting 
better health care from physicians. If §63-30-4 eliminates per-
sonal liability of state employees, then physicians employed by 
the state will no longer be concerned about the potential fo~ a 
malpractice claim. Such a result will certainly not promote the 
desirable result of better health care in state-operated facili-
ties in Utah. 
Finally, as an alternative, if the Court were to 
interpret §63-30-4 to mean that personal liability of a stat~ 
employee is only preserved if the plaintiffs meet the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, plaintiffs sugges 
that the claims of the minor plaintiff Michael Patrick Payne 
against Drs. Meyers and Kesler have been properly preserved. 
lower court refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
State as to the minor plaintiff's claims, thus ruling that ~ 15 
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.. ms r1ad been timely filed. The main purpose for the amendment 
~6l-30-4 was to close the loophole in the immunity and indem-
il/ statutory scheme whereby the State could be protected 
against liability if the plaintiff failed to meet the Immunity 
Ace's notice requirements, but could still be liable under the 
_.·,demn1ty Act if its employee was still personally liable. See 
_ornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977), (Wilkins' con-
0Jrr1ng opinion); Developments in Utah Law, 1978 Utah L.Rev. 741, 
-, "6. 
Since, in the instant case, the claims of the minor 
plaintiff against the State have been properly noticed and the 
Slate can be held liable, there is no reason to preclude personal 
11ao1lity of the physicians because plaintiffs are not using the 
- .• 1ms against said physicians as a back-door method of getting 
H the State. 
In summary, plaintiffs contend that even if 563-30-4, as 
3rnended, is deemed to apply to the facts of this case, it cannot 
ce construed to deny plaintiffs their conunon law right of action 
•gainst the individual defendant physicians for their personal 
'e~!tgence. On that basis, the lower court's granting of summary 
1 1ame~t pursuant to §63-30-4 was improper and should be reversed 
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POINT III. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S63-30-4, AS AMENDED, 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
As indicated in Point I, supra, if Utah Code Annotated 
S63-30-4, as amended, is applied to the facts of the instant 
case, such application would give retroactive effect to the 
statute because plaintiffs' claims against the defendant doctors 
arose prior to the effective date of the amended statute. 
ART. I, S7 of the Utah Constitution states: 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
In Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d 353 (1940), the 
defendants argued that an amendment to a portion of the state's 
water statutes, if applied retroactively, would deprive defen-
dants of a vested right, and therefore violate the Constitution. 
Although the court determined that the amendment to the statute 
affected procedure only, and therefore retroactive application 
would not deprive defendants of any vested rights, the court made 
the following significant statement regarding vested rights of 
action: 
A vested right in procedure of a court is 
quite different from a vested right of 
action. With reference to a right of 
action it is stated 6 RCL under Title, 
'Constitutional Law', ... as follows: 'A 
vested right of action is property in the 
same sense in which tangible things are 
property, and is equally protected against 
arbitrary interference, and whether it 
springs from contract or the principles of 
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the common law, it is not competent for the 
legislature to take it away.' 
And this Court has approved and affirmed 
this doctrine in the case of Halling v. 
Industrial Comm. of Utah, et al., 71 Utah 
112, 263 P. 78 • • • • [104 P.2d at 360) 
In addition, applying a statute retroactively to deny a 
party of substantive rights of action against governmental 
empiJyces has been found to be a denial of due process under the 
united States Constitution. See Barrick v. Dist. of Columbia, 
J 73 A. 2d 372 ( D.C. 1961). Thus, retroactive application of 
~63~30-4, as amended, to the facts of the plaintiffs' claims, 
••ould constitute a violation of ART I, S7, of the Utah 
Constitution, and also of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
states: 
Furthermore, ART. I, Sll, of the Utah Constitution 
All courts shall be open, and every per-
son, for an injury done to him and his per-
son, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribu-
nal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Plaintiffs contend that if §63-30-4 is interpreted to 
:_cot,,lly abolish the common law right of action against a state 
~mpl0yec for his simple negligence, then the statute violates §11 
'RT. I because it denies plaintiffs' access to the courts for 
- "· Jy by due cour:se of law. It will undoubtedly be argued by 
lefen.Jants that plaintiffs have not been denied access to the 
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courts by this statute because there is still a remedy available 
against the state. However, plaintiffs suggest that the qualiti 
tive change in their rights is so extensive under S63-30-4, tha· 
it is in violation of ART I, Sll. 
For example, if the common law right of action against 
the employees in their individual capacities is totally abo-
lished, the only possibility plaintiffs have to recover is 
against the state and then only if they meet all the rigid 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, such as the one-
year notice provision. Furthermore, there is a significant 
substantive difference between the claim against the state and 
the claim against the individual doctors. Plaintiffs are 
possibly limited in their amount of damages to a maximum of 
$100, 000 per person under the terms of the Governmental Immunity 
Act (U.C.A. S63-30-29), whereas in an action against an indivi-
dual doctor, no such limitation is present. With such restric-
tions placed on plaintiffs, they have been effectively denied 
their "remedy by due course of law" which is guaranteed them by 
ART. I, Sll. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge this court's prior decision of 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 13 Utah :u8, 
191 P.2d 612 (1948), which may be construed to hold contrary to 
plaintiffs' position on this issue. In response, however, plai,-
tiffs cite to the court the case of Barrick v. Dist. of Colum~ 
supra, wherein the court explained that the United States Code 
affecting governmental liability of the District of Columbia was 
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_1,anged following the date of an accident involving plaintiff and 
: 1e Jr i «er of an ambulance employed by the District of Columbia. 
vr1,)r tr1 the amendment to the statute, the District of Columbia 
nad complete immunity from liability, but actions could be filed 
.ya1nst its employees in their individual capacity for simple 
negligence. The amendment to this statute abolished the liabil-
ltY of the individual employees, but allowed liability against 
the District of Columbia where an emergency vehicle was involved 
if the plaintiff could prove gross negligence against the 
District of Columbia. The statute was expressly made to be 
retroactive, and on the basis of the application of that statute 
to plaintiff's case, a directed verdict was entered in favor of 
the District of Columbia because plaintiff could not prove gross 
1egligence. Plaintiff appealed, and the District of Columbia 
r0urt held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
retroactively. One of the arguments raised by the District of 
'o lurnb1 a was that the retroactive application of the amended sta-
tute did not destroy a vested right because it replaced 
?laintiff's original right to sue the employee with a right to 
sue the District of Columbia. The court refused to agree with 
t~dl reasoning. The court stated: 
There might be be some merit to the 
13overnment 's argument if the Act merely 
affected remedies or procedure. • • • But 
the Act does more than that. As was said 
by the court in Weil v. Taxi Cabs of 
Cincinnati, 139 Ohio St. 198, 39 N.E. 148, 
151, 'If the statute created a right to 
compensation which did not theretofore 
exist, it was dealing with a new substan-
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tive right, and the fact that the legisla-
tion has the effect of extinguishing one 
type of right and creating another in lieu 
thereof, does not make it remedial legisla-
tion as to the rights involved.' •.. 
As the effect of the D.C. Employee 
Non-Liability Act is to retroactively 
divest appellants of their common-law right 
of action to recover against the ambulance 
driver on proof of ordinary negligence and 
allows recovery against the District of 
Columbia only on proof of gross negligence, 
we are forced to declare that the Act in 
its application to the facts of this case 
results in an unconstitutional deprivation 
of appellants' property right. [173 A.2d 
at 376) 
The reasoning of the District of Columbia court is analogous to 
plaintiffs' claim that the change in the Governmental Immunity 
Act in Utah precludes them adequate access to the courts. 
Substituting a more restrictive right for one that was more 
liberal, does not preclude the constitutional defective nature J' 
the statute in denying adequate access to the courts. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, states in part, that "no STATE •.. shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due pro 
cess of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." 
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., supra, sets 
forth the general principle in Utah that a vested right of act1° 
is property protected by the due process clause of the 
Constitution. Plaintiffs have a vested right in their claims 
against the individual doctors, said right arising out of the 
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,egl igent conduct of the doctors and the obligations incurred by 
; 1 nt1ffs as a result thereof for medical services. Section 
.,_,_ iu-4. 3s amended, takes that right away from plaintiffs. The 
_,_ 3 tute 1s unconstitutional to the extent that it attempts to 
-~ e ~hat right away from the plaintiffs because it denies them 
,t~perty without due process of law. 
In Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 
r i040 (1931), the plaintiff brought suit for a violation of 
'Jtah 's Blue Sky Law. However, the statute which gave rise to 
~la1ntiff 's claim had been repealed prior to the date plaintiff 
l1led her lawsuit. The statute was in effect at the time of the 
'ransaction which gave rise to the claim. The repeal of the 
statute did away with plaintiff's claim under the Blue Sky Laws. 
Ihe defendants argued that since the action was commenced after 
repeal of the statute, plaintiff had no cause of action. The 
•
1 •ah Supreme Court disagreed. The court stated: 
[H]er right of action was nevertheless 
within the protection of the Constitution 
and could not be destroyed by legislation • 
. It is a vested right, in the nature 
of a property right, and ought to be 
regarded as property in the sense that 
tangible things are property and equally 
protected by the Constitution against 
arbitrary interference by the Legislature. 
[ 300 P. at 1045] 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the statute is 
nst1tut1nnal because it denies them equal protection under 
l ·~W'S. The statute makes a classification which has no 
nal 'ias1s. The classification is composed, in the instant 
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case, of claimants of employees of state-operated health care 
facilities. Plaintiffs are denied their common law right of 
action against physician-defendants simply because those 
physician-defendants happened to be working for a governrnenta, 
entity at the time they committed malpractice. Other than the 
fact that these physicians worked for a governmental entity, 
there is absolutely no difference between them and private phys1· 
cians. Each of the individual physicians in the instant case 
carries medical malpractice insurance with a private insurance 
carrier, just the same as any private physician practicing in the 
state of Utah. There is no rational basis for allowing these 
defendants to avoid personal liability for their malpractice 
simply because they were working for a governmental entity. The 
classification made by the statute is discriminatory against 
persons who choose, or who may be required, due to the availabi-
lity of facilities, or their own financial ability, to obtain 
their medical services from physicians employed by governmental 
entities. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's summary judgment dismissing 
plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants Myers and 
Kesler should be reversed and the case remanded for trial on t!,e 
issue of those defendants' negligence and liability to pla1nt 1 ~ 
for the following reasons: 
1. The lower court's application of Utah Code AnnotJI~ 
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, , i0-4, as amended, to the facts of this case to abolish all 
Ptsonal liability of governmental employees, is improper because 
0 ~ pld111liffs' substantive rights vested and causes of action 
0 1 'oe µrior to the effective date of the amended statute, and the 
_, ••ute cannot be applied retroactively to abolish plaintiffs' 
-laims against the individual physician-defendants. 
2. Even if S63-30-4 is applicable to the facts of this 
case, it cannot be interpreted to abolish common law causes of 
action for medical malpractice against individual defendant phy-
s1~ians such as those involved in this case. It is contrary to 
proper and reasonable statutory interpretation, and is also 
contrary to policy to interpret that statute to mean that indivi-
rlual employees of the state are totally immune from liability for 
their own negligence. 
3. Application of §63-30-4 to abolish the claims of 
~laintif fs against the individual defendant physicians is 
J11const1tutional under ART. I, §§7 and 11 of the Utah 
'onstitution and also under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
united States Constitution because it denies the plaintiffs ade-
1uate remedies for the wrongs committed against them and also 
~ecause it denies them their property without due process of law 
ind also denies them equal protection under the laws. 
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1983. 
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